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ABSTRACT
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic prompted universities across the United States to
close campuses in Spring 2020. Universities are deliberating whether, when, and how they should resume
in-person instruction in Fall 2020. In this essay, we discuss some practical considerations for the use of 2
potentially useful control strategies based on testing: (1) severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2) reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing followed by case-patient
isolation and quarantine of close contacts, and (2) serological testing followed by an “immune shield”
approach, that is, low social distancing requirements for seropositive persons. The isolation of case-patients
and quarantine of close contacts may be especially challenging, and perhaps prohibitively difficult, on many
university campuses. The “immune shield” strategy might be hobbled by a low positive predictive value of
the tests used in populations with low seroprevalence. Both strategies carry logistical, ethical, and financial
implications. The main nonpharmaceutical interventions will remain methods based on social distancing
(eg, capping class size) and personal protective behaviors (eg, universal facemask wearing in public space)
until vaccines become available, or unless the issues discussed herein can be resolved in such a way that
using mass testing as main control strategies becomes viable.
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In spring 2020, coronavirus disease 2019(COVID-19) spread across the United Statesand impelled universities to switch to online
instruction. Although the pandemic trajectory remains
uncertain,1 scientific consensus is that the pandemic
will continue into the fall.2 Many epidemiologists have
warned of a rebound of cases, due in part to a relaxation
of social distancing.3,4 One university president wrote
recently, “The COVID-19 virus will remain a fact of
life this autumn.”5 University student life, including
classroom instruction, cafeterias, residential halls, and
sport and cultural activities, provides ample opportuni-
ties for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2) transmission. Alleged “failure” to pro-
tect students from SARS-CoV-2 infection on campus
carries legal risks too, as some may file class-action law
suits against their universities, as in a recent example.6
To reopen campuses and avoid outbreaks this fall will
require careful deliberation.
Anticipating the Fall Semester, universities are delib-
erating whether, and to what extent, they should
reopen their campuses to in-person instruction.7,8
As of June 23, 64% of 1030 US colleges surveyed plan
for in-person instruction, while 24% planned for
online or hybrid models.8 As universities announce
their intentions, all have placed public health consid-
erations at the top of criteria for reopening. InMay, the
AmericanCollege HealthAssociation (ACHA) issued
its guidelines on campus reopening,9 and the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published
its “Considerations.”10 Both documents provide gen-
eral information and infection control guidelines.
Neither document discusses in detail the feasibility of
using extensive viral or serological testing strategies,
which have been proposed by some as potential impor-
tant control strategies.11,12 To the best of our knowl-
edge, the implementation of an extensive viral or
serological testing program was unbeknownst to most
university campuses before the COVID-19 pandemic.
To further the debate on reopening university cam-
puses for in-person instruction without a safe and effec-
tive COVID-19 vaccine, in this policy analysis, we
discuss the practical aspects of implementing such test-
ing strategies on college campuses (Table 1).
RT-PCR Testing, Contact Tracing, Isolation,
and Quarantine
Reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR) tests can be used to identify virus-shedding
individuals.ACHA recommends campus-wide syndromic
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surveillance and that universities should ensure “access to
immediate viral testing for all students, faculty, or staff with
symptoms.”9 Given that SARS-CoV-2 can be transmitted
presymptomatically,13 ACHA recommends “viral surveil-
lance of asymptomatic students” where possible.9
As an example, the University of California San Diego is
extending mass testing to asymptomatic individuals.12 The
voluntary programwill provide students with RT-PCR self-test
kits and will test “60 to 90%” of the campus population “on a
recurring basis.”12 Recurrent mass testing could be useful in
detecting asymptomatic individuals and reducing transmission
to others. For a basic reproduction number of 2.5,14 2 of
3 potential transmissions must be prevented by prompt diag-
nosis and isolation to keep the reproduction number <1.
Given an incubation period of around 5-6 days,15,16 and the
assumption that themajority of transmission occurs after symp-
tom onset,13,17 even testing everyone weekly, followed by rapid
isolation and quarantine of infected individuals and their close
contacts, respectively,18 might not be enough to prevent
widespread campus transmission.
However, there are serious caveats. Mass testing is expensive.19
Medicare pays $100 for laboratory tests using high-throughput
technologies for the detection of SARS-CoV-2.20 Using this
pricing as a benchmark, each round of testing a campus of
10,000 individuals would cost 1 million dollars. Mass testing
is logistically challenging, too. For example, to finish self-
testing 10,000 individuals every week, a daily rate of self-
testing 1429 individuals is needed. A staggered schedule of
return and testing may make the logistics more manageable.
Many universities may not have access to laboratories that
can process a large number of specimens quickly enough so that
results can be delivered in time to be relevant for contact
tracing and isolation. Universities might not be able to rely
on external laboratories for large testing programs because of
cost and limits on throughput.
The program’s effectiveness in preventing SARS-CoV-2
transmission would depend upon high levels of voluntary
participation, and a ready ability to support self-isolation
and quarantine (eg, single residential rooms for isolated and
quarantined students, staff monitoring of compliance, record-
ing symptoms and clinical status, providing food and medical
care). Many universities may lack the space and personnel
needed to conduct such programs, especially during times
when campus outbreaks are detected.18 Finally, many univer-
sities may lack the legal authority to enforce isolation and quar-
antine or otherwise to limit students’ freedom of movement.
Further challenges stem from the fact that tests are imperfect
and produce both false negative and false positive results.21,22
False negative results may lead to otherwise avoidable trans-
mission. Some rapid tests are reported to have a sensitivity
as low as 85%,23 ie, there will be 15 false negatives for every
100 SARS-CoV-2 positive individuals. In programs relying
on unsupervised self-collected nasal specimens, false negative
results may arise from improper collection technique or trans-
port. As long as SARS-CoV-2 prevalence on campus remains
low, false positive results might be a larger concern, as the
positive predictive value may be low unless the specificity is
as high as 100%.24 This could lead to healthy students being
misdiagnosed as being infected, and thus isolated, further exac-
erbating the resource and legal challenges mentioned above.
Specificity can be increased if 2 tests are required to confirm
a case. However, this will substantially increase the cost and
workload of mass testing. Specificity can also be increased if
only symptomatic individuals are tested. However, because
asymptomatic transmission is well documented,13,25 focusing
TABLE 1
Advantages and Disadvantages of Mass RT-PCR Testing for SARS-CoV-2 and Mass Serological Testing for Antibodies Against
SARS-CoV-2
Testing Pros Cons
RT-PCR testing Identify individuals currently infected with SARS-CoV-2
including asymptomatic individuals
Provide information for monitoring the epidemic
Public confidence
When performed frequently enough, it might reduce
transmission below the critical threshold of reproduction
number= 1
Expensive
Self-isolation and quarantining require large resources
(buildings, personnel)
Depending on the sensitivity or specificity of the test,
potential issues with false positive and false negative
results
Legal issues with regard to restricting movement
Serological testing for antibodies Identify individuals who have antibodies and who might
be immune to reinfection
Seroprevalence of the campus community
Needs to be repeated less frequently than RT-PCR testing
Expensive
Still unclear how test results (antibody levels) relate to
protection against re-infection. Might lead to a false
sense of safety.
Poor test performance could lead to more transmission.
Difficult ethical considerations regarding the “immune
shield” option.
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on only symptomatic individuals is not an option if testing
serves as themain control strategy. Overall, the profound logis-
tical challenges of a test-and-isolate strategy prevent it from
being the mainstay of outbreak control.
Serological Testing for Antibodies and “Immune
Shield” Strategy
Another testing strategy that has been proposed is to apply
serological testing to identify individuals who have developed
protective antibodies against SARS-CoV-2 and assign them as
“immune shields.”11 Others have discussed the idea of issuing
immunity certification,26 or immunity-based licenses,27 to indi-
viduals with antibodies against SARS-CoV-2. Assuming such
individuals are immune to reinfection, they can be deployed
to provide “shield immunity” to preferentially interact with sus-
ceptible or infected individuals, thus reducing transmission.11,28
Amodel showed that such an immune shielding approach could
potentially lead to a reduction in outbreak size.11
While conceptually sound, it is unclear if such a serological
testing-based strategy is viable for college campuses. First,
the amount of protection provided by a given level of antibod-
ies, which the test measures, is unknown.29 Second, it is uncer-
tain for how long immunity might last.30,31 There is evidence
that immunity against SARS-CoV-2 might wane quickly.
A study found that 40% (12/30) of asymptomatic individuals
and 12.9% (4/31) of symptomatic individuals became IgG-
negative 8 weeks after discharge from hospitals.32 Third, false
positives are a concern.31,33 If an individual is placed into an
“immune shield” position despite not actually being immune,
this could lead to an increase in transmission.28 Fourth, pre-
liminary results of seroprevalence studies suggest that immune
individuals will be in short supply. A meta-analysis of multiple
seroprevalence studies using Bayesian hierarchical models,34
found that seroprevalence is low among the populations inves-
tigated, with 2-6% in Los Angeles County, California,35 0-2%
in Santa Clara County, California,36 1.6-2.6% in San Miguel
County, Colorado, and 15-41% in Chelsea, Massachusetts.
Cautious interpretation of studies where participants were
recruited by means of social media advertisement as a conven-
ience sample,36 is needed given potential selection bias; account-
ing for the uncertainty in the sensitivity and specificity of the
tests is also recommended.37,38 Concerns remainwhether studies
in certain COVID-19 hotspots are representative of the general
population nationwide. It is likely that, in August 2020, univer-
sities can expect <10% of returning students being potentially
immune while the majority will remain susceptible. If 5% of a
campus community were to be seropositive, this would mean
1,000 individuals on a campus of 20,000. If these seropositive
individuals could be deployed to have 10 times as many contacts
as other groups, it would lead to a reduction of ~31% in trans-
mission, not enough to get the reproduction number below 1.11
Furthermore, the logistical challenges are obvious. When
semester begins, everyone needs to get tested rapidly. Then,
seropositive individuals will be trained to fill positions with
high contact rates (eg, campus bus drivers, food service work-
ers, residential facility managers). Both matching positions
to talents and on-the-job training take time. Cost is another
concern. Medicare pays $42-45 per SARS-CoV-2 serological
test.20 This translates into a price tag of $840,000-$900,000
for a 20,000-strong campus. Ethical issues have also been
raised.39 If student employment opportunities are limited,
and they are open to immune people only, would students
deliberately get themselves infected as in “COVID-19
parties”40 so that they can take up those jobs? Conversely,
there are media reports that some recovered individuals have
been stigmatized.31 It is also known that, currently, vulnerable
minorities are more likely to be infected.41 Would it be equit-
able to ask those individuals who were infected because they
were unable to shelter-at-home to perform extra duties as
“immune shields”? Thus, with all these logistical, financial,
and ethical concerns, while the serological testing and immune
shield strategy might be feasible in subpopulations such as
health-care workers, it appears not to be a promising control
strategy for college campuses.
CONCLUSIONS
We discussed some practical considerations for 2 potential
testing-based control strategies as applied to college campus
reopening: RT-PCR testing followed by case-patient isolation
and quarantine of close contacts; and serological testing followed
by “immune shields.” Given the logistic and ethical issues, nei-
ther approach appears to be viable as a main strategy. We do
believe they could be used as supplementary strategies or applied
to specific groups (eg, individuals with high contact rates).
Unless the issues we discussed above can be resolved in such a
way that using mass testing as main control strategies becomes
viable, the main nonpharmaceutical interventions will remain
methods based on social distancing and personal protective
behaviors until vaccines become available. Online or hybrid
instruction this fall will significantly reduce the risk of on-campus
outbreaks.42 For those planning for in-person instruction,8
social distancing measures, including capping class size at a
small number,43 and the adoption of personal protective
behaviors, including universal facemask wearing in public
space,44 will be required to reduce—but not eliminate—
on-campus transmission.24 Given the ongoing debate in
some university systems whether to make facemask-wearing in
public mandatory,45 and the challenges of enforcing social dis-
tancing among students outside the classroom setting, there is a
sizeable risk of on-campus COVID-19 outbreaks when in-person
instruction resumes on college campuses this fall.24
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